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Rev. Carroll investigates the lack of 
acceptable, precise definitions of life, 
death, man in the discussions of life 
control and death control. The Chris-
tian must II1SISt, he concludes, that 
such definitions and resultant stan-
dards of conduct safeguard the dignity 
and destiny of man. 
Life Control and Death Control, 
Definitions and the Dignity of Man 
Rev. Charles Carroll 
To discuss the prolongation of life 
without also discussing the abbrevia-
tion of li fe, represented by abortion 
on demand, is to ignore the total 
problem - that of life control and 
death control. Justification for what is 
purported to be " liberalized abortion" 
was first sought on the basis of incest , 
rape , potential deformity of the fetus, 
and danger to the physical and/or 
mental health of the mother. Let us 
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examine each of these "reasons" for 
liberalized abortion. 
Incest was advanced as a reason for 
abortion more because of the emo-
tional value it can command in a 
debate rather than from any rea l 
concern for the woman. In fact , 
proponents of libera lized abortion 
were well aware of the fact that parties 
to an incestuous relationship would 
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seldom, if ever , seek abort ion on this 
ground because of fear of publici ty . 
In the case of rape as a cause for 
abortion, the distinction between 
statutory and criminal rape was rarely 
made. Infrequent mention was made 
of the pregnancies experienced by 
known rape victims and almost no 
mention was made of the freedom 
from fear that comes with immediate 
medical care . 
As far as potential deformity of the 
fetus was concerned , frequent mention 
was made of recurrent rubella epi-
demics and of other possible deform-
ities that could occur, although men-
tion of new vaccines and new 
treatments was rare. The inerrancy of 
diagnosis was always assumed. 
Threat to the physical and/or 
mental health of the mother was 
advanced as a reason for liberalized 
abortion, but it was never explic itly 
defined. The claim of threat to the 
mental health of the mother was 
considered substantial if it was con-
firmed by a psychotherapist following 
an hour-long interview. Similarly, 
threat to physical health was also 
advanced as a substantial claim, in 
spite of the fact that medical advances 
have rendered such threats minimal. 
Even though the adequacy of the 
reasons for liberalized abortion is 
questionable , abortion proposals have 
been widely accepted. What are the 
underlying causes of this wide accept-
ance?F irst, man's loss of faith in the 
future ; second , his fear of losing what 
he has; third , his naive belief that "the 
pursuit of happiness" will immunize 
him from pain and that his hedonism 
and others' hedonism will never bring 
them into contlict. 
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It is certainly no mere coincidence 
that insistence upon a woman's right 
to abortion on demand comes at a 
time when motherhood has been 
robbed of its dignity; when parent-
hood has lost its sense of privilege; 
when family life is disintegrating ; 
when man and the society in which he 
lives are engulfed by nihilism ; when 
men's anxieties for their own future 
would deny the unborn the right to 
li fe ; and when biological determinists 
- with un substantiable statistics -
have filled men with such fear of a 
population explosion that they feel 
driven to voluntary life control mea-
sures lest mandatory controls be 
imposed . 
At no time in th is controversy have 
men paused long enough to realize 
that by not defining what they mean 
by life, death, and man , they have 
accepted definitions which may well 
affect them as long as they live and 
even determine the number of years 
they may be permitted to live. 
Most scientists agree that the 
uniquely human life begins at concep-
tion. In the U.S., prenatal life may be 
taken at different times in its 
development : In Cali fornia, up to the 
20th week of life; in New York , up to 
the 24th week. Some present abortion 
proposals suggest that no time limit 
should be specified. 
If proponents of abortion are 
pressed to define life , they talk of 
viability. If pressed to define viability, 
they explain it as the point at which 
the fetus becomes capable of life 
independent of the mother. 
Let us now examine what the word 
"independent" means to any defini-
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tion of life. The retarded are not 
independent. Some of us can still 
remember the Gestapo's call upon 
Pastor von Bodelschwingh and their 
demand that he deliver up his young 
patients. The totally disabled victims 
of automobile and industrial accidents 
are not independent. Some of us wince 
when we hear hospital beds spoken of 
as "precious hospital resources," with 
the implication that they should be 
made available first to those who can 
be rehabilitated and who can again 
become productive. The disabled vet-
erans of our wars are not independent. 
Some of us recall pictures in Life (May 
22, 1970) of the treatment given to 
American soldiers who recently re-
turned from the war in Southeast Asia 
to Veterans Administration hospitals 
in the U.S. The mentally ill are not 
independent. Some of us can still 
remember Hadamar near Marburg, 
Sonnenstein near Dresden, and similar 
institutions in Germany in which 
240,000 of 300,000 mental patients 
were liquidated in the years 1939-45 . 
The aged and the senile are not 
independent. Some of us know all too 
well the neglect shown them in our 
time (marked as it is by disruption of 
home life) and the decrease in Church 
giving and state aid , despite the 
increased need. 
When Robert Ardrey writes in Life 
(Feb. 20, 1970) that "The humanist's 
preoccupation with the numbers game 
has sacrificed quality for human 
quantity," the reader cannot but be 
reminded of the use of this very term 
"quality of life" by the masters of 
Auschwitz and Buchenwald. When 
Ardrey complains that "Life must be 
prolonged, whatever agony it presents 
the dying. A child defective must 
somehow be saved sufficiently to join 
the breeding population . To restrict 
the reproductive righ ts of the geneti-
cally afflicted is considered an act of 
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discrimination ," the reader readily 
perceives the relationship between this 
ideology and population control and 
prevention of "pollution of the gene 
pool," both coming at a tim·e when we 
have broken the genetic code and 
fashioned a gene. l 
Ardrey's solutions become clear a 
few paragraphs later. "We," he insists , 
"must consider enforced contracep-
tion, whether through taxation on 
surplus children or through more 
severe means such as conception 
license . Abortion should be freely 
available to those suffering unintended 
pregnancy." Whether women today 
who seek abortion on demand have 
ever contemplated the possibility of 
abortion on demand of the state, they 
should consider Ardrey's words. Taxa-
tion on surplus children or limits on 
state aid are merely subtle forms of 
demand. 
That these proposed solutions 
would be in'ternational in their applica-
tion and that the "haves" would apply 
a policy akin to th at of triage 2 to the 
"have nots" in the distribution of food 
surpluses becomes indelibly clear when 
Ardrey declares , "In internationa l 
relations any aid to peoples who 
through ignorance , prejudice or polit-
ica hypnosis fail to control their 
numbers might be forbidden." 
He does not identify who the "we" 
are who will make and implement 
these decisions or by what means they 
will be made . Neither does he specify 
what world agency would support 
them or what power would be made 
available to them for enforcing their 
aims. What is clear is that an elitist 
"we" is bent upon gaining public 
acceptance of its population control 
policies at a time when the Census 
Bureau concedes that its 1967 projec-
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tion of the population of the U.S . in 
the year 2000 may be an overestimate 
of 100,000,000 .3 Such a program as 
Ardrey proposes - to quote from the 
late Thomas Merton's commentary on 
Ardrey's "African Genesis" - is 
rooted in the "tough and call ous 
romanticism of the street gang or of 
the fascist storm troop - a romantic-
ism no less fallac ious and deceptive for 
the fact that it also on occasion covers 
itself with a veneer of 'rea lism' and 
pseudo-science . ,,4 
When Life's editors headed 
Ardrey's paragraphs on th e birth rate 
with the words "Man Has Lost Birth 
Control Instinct " and his paragraphs 
on proposed so lutions with "Compas-
sio n Has Sacrificed Man's Quality" 
they were apparently accusing our 
fat hers of committing crimes against 
humanity when they educated men to 
care for their fellowmen; constructed 
hospitals , schools , and churches; built 
dams, roads , sanitation , and water 
filtration systems at home and over-
seas. In other words , to the propon-
ents of Ardrey 's argumen ts compas-
sion has become a sin and charity a 
vice. This philosophy ordains that man 
live by se lect ive breeding and sc ience 
alone. It erases the last vestige of 
difference between physician and 
veterinarian and rewords the Book of 
Job (1 .2 Ib) to read: "Scientific Man 
gave , Scientific Man has taken away ; 
blessed be the name of Scientific 
Man ." 
If the li fe control arguments have 
left individual human life undefined, 
the death cont rol arguments have left 
individual human death similarly un-
defined, with no less significant 
implications. 
''The Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Harvard Medical 
School to Examine the Definition of 
Brain Death" li sted four criteria: 
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"Unreceptivity and unresponsitivity" ; 
"no movements or breathing"; " no 
reflexes"; and "fla t encephalogram. ,,5 
Wh ile the authors might be faulted for 
failure to use the term "total brain 
death" and while there were some 
infelicitous uses of the term "bra in 
damage," this definition represents an 
honest effort to be more prec ise than 
traditional definitions of death have 
been. However, it may raise more 
questions than it answers. As Dr. 
David D. Rutstein of Harvard suggests: 
We are saying that in man life "exists 
only when he is aware of and can 
respond to his environment." Dr. 
Ru tstein himself asks: "Does accept-
ance of this concept mean that it is no 
longer necessary to treat ... the 
senile?" "How do eligible donors 
differ in principle from totally feeble-
minded individuals?" "Does this new 
definition ... open up new channels 
of criminal activity that will lead to 
the burking6 of patients to increase 
the supply of eligible donors?"7 
The demand for a new definition of 
death is obviously linked to the 
question of pro longat ion of life and no 
less obviously linked to that of organ 
transplantation . The question of pro-
longation of life reflects the need for 
new definitions of "ordinary" and 
"extraordinary" means of preserving 
life, because Pope Pius XII's defini-
tions have been rendered obsolete by 
recent medical advances . Its concern is 
with withdrawal of life support sys-
tems, allowing the patient to die. No 
direct in terven tion in the pa tien t's 
dying is contemplated. The quest ion 
of organ transplants reflects the need 
for organs in a viable state and possible 
reestablishment of life support systems 
after a declaration of death. When the 
dea th of the organism as a whole has 
been declared, death of the whole 
organism can be postponed. 
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It is precisely this aspect of the 
problem that troubles the philosopher. 
Hans Jonas, professor of philosophy at 
the New School of Social Research in 
New York, insists that no definition is 
a substitute for knowledge; that "it is 
one thing when to cease delaying 
death, but another when to start doing 
violence to the body . .. For the first 
purpose, we need not know the exact 
borderline ... between life and death 
- we leave nature to cross it. ... For 
the second purpose, we must know . . . 
; and to use any definition short of the 
maximal for perpetrating on a possibly 
penultimate state what only the 
ultimate state can permit is to arrogate 
a knowledge which , I think, we cannot 
possibly have.',8 
Moreover, there is reason to fear 
the use to which such a definition can 
be put. As Jonas points out, "If the 
comatose patient is by definition dead, 
he is a patient no more but a corpse, 
with which can be done whatever law 
or custom or the deceased's will or 
next of kin permit and sundry 
interests urge to do with a corpse . . . . 
Why turn the respirator off? Once we 
are assured that we deal with a cadaver 
there are no logical reasons against 
(and strong pragmatic reasons for) 
going on with the artificial 'animation ' 
and keeping the 'deceased's' body on 
call, as a bank for life-fresh organs, 
possibly also as a plant for manufac-
turing hormones or other bio-chemical 
compounds in demand . ... Tempting 
also is the idea of a self-replenishing 
blood bank . And that is not all . Let us 
not forget research. Why shouldn ' t the 
most wonderful surgical and grafting 
experiments be conducted on the 
complaisant subject-nonsubject, with 
no limits set to daring? Why not 
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immunological explorations, infections 
with diseases old and new, trying out 
of drugs?,,9 Professor Jonas lJIight al30 
have mentioned present-day discus-
sions of the purchase and sale of 
human organs and of amending ana-
tomical gift laws by declaring human 
organs a natural and national re-
source. I 0 
To say that anyone of these things 
can happen is not to say that it will 
happen, but the temptation to do 
what one can do has been known to 
become irresistible. History and defini-
tions have often unwittingly provided 
a rationale for man's inhumanity to 
man. In less than five hundred years , 
the West has moved from the concept 
of maiestas (sovereignty) of Jean 
Bodin ll to the absolute monarchy of 
Louis XIV ; through the "nation in 
arms" of Napoleon to the 
Wehrwirtschaft and Totalkrieg of 
Hitler. 
We have moved from slavery to its 
abolition ; through the reinstitution of 
slavery in the form of racism to a 
genocide "so sterilized by terms like 
'Losungsmoglichkeit,' 'Sonderbehand-
lung ,' 'Evakuierung,' and others that it 
is possible to ignore the fact that 
human beings are being anni-
hilated ."12 
We have moved from the Industrial 
Revolution through the Technological 
Revolution and the Cultural Explosion 
with such speed that, as Edward 
Schillebeeckx perceives, "The con-
straint imposed by rationality - the 
principle which is above all operative 
in the designing of a new society and a 
new future - is threatening to reduce 
man himself and the future to the level 
of things - more material for objective 
analysis and planning."l 3 
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The bombing of Rotterdam; the 
attempt to " erase" Coventry; the 
900-day siege of Leningrad; the 
concentration camps of Nazi Ger-
many; the fire storm of Dresden; the 
detonation of the atomic bomb over 
Hiroshima ; the brutal imposition of 
Soviet rule on Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia ; the mass murder of hundreds of 
thousands of Indonesians; the at-
tempted "liquidation" of monarchist 
Yemenites , South Sudanese, Kurds, 
Tibetans, and the Patachus Indians in 
Brazil ; the starvation of the Biafrans; 
and the Great Power rivalries reflected 
in the present wars in Southeast Asia 
and the Middle East - all have merely 
brought the premises of an earlier age 
to their inexorable conclusion , and 
violence "simplifies" human relations 
by denying the other exists . 
Moreover , "the revolution that is 
taking place now (is) in the danger of a 
se lf-made future" and the "real danger 
(is) no longer a flight from the world , 
but a flight from the future, and in 
many different forms - the 'world' 
has , in fact, become the 'future' ."14 
For this sickness unto death , 
Christianity has an antidote . As Karl 
Rahner sees it, Christianity is not only 
the religion of the future, but the 
religion of the absolute future .ls The 
significance of Christianity for intra-
-mundane society and its goals lies in 
its hope. "By its hope for an absolute 
future," Rahner declares, "Christianity 
defends man against the temptation of 
engaging in the justified intra-mundane 
efforts for the future with such energy 
that every generation is always sacri-
ficed in favour of the next , so that the 
future becomes a Moloch before 
whom the man existing at present is 
butchered for the sake of some man 
who is never real and always still to 
come.,,16 
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While he wrote these words in 
"Marxist Utopia and the Christian 
Future of Man," they are peculiarly 
applicable to a world which would 
appear to be willing to sacrifice the 
principle that utter helplessness de-
mands utter protection ; a world which 
would appear to be unmindful of the 
fact that denial of the right to life to 
anyone is a threat to the right to life 
of everyone ; a world in which a 
distinguished few in science are asking 
if parenthood is a right or a privilege 
and insisting that only if it is viewed as 
a privilege is there hope for man-
kind .17 
Men may scoff at Dostoyevski's 
dictum that without God nothing is 
immoral, but surely some of the 
greatest scientists of our time have 
found these words worth pondering . If 
the life scientist is to avoid the 
experience that the physical scientist 
had in the development of atomic 
fission and if he is to be spared the 
gnawing after thoughts that plagued 
Max Planck, Otto Hahn, Albert Ein-
stein , and J. Robert Oppenheimer , he 
would do well to reflect upon the 
ambiguity of progress, the fallibility of 
human judgment, and man's proclivity 
to self-centeredness in a world in 
which Jacques Ellul feels "That 
violence is so generously condoned .. . 
shows that Hitler won his war after 
all." I 8 
There is a reason why Max Planck 
observed: "Everything that is relative 
presupposes the existence of some-
thing that is absolute."19 A reason 
why Albert Einstein declared : "Only 
the Church stood squarely across the 
path of Hitler 's campaign for sup-
pressing the truth. I never had any 
interest in the Church before, but now 
... I am forced to confess that what I 
once despised I now praise unreserv-
edly ."20 A reason why J. Robert 
Oppenheimer stated: "I believe the 
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strength and soundness of Christian 
sensibility, the meaning of love and 
charity have changed the world at least 
as much as technological develop-
ments."21 This statement was made 
by the same Oppenheimer who said 
that the construction of the atomic 
bomb brought him to recognize sin. 
Man is asking again who he is and 
what he wants to be . He is looking to 
his past and to the future to find 
answers. And while he may find it 
easier "to fall into (his) own emptiness 
than into the abyss of the Blessed 
Mystery ,"2 2 he is not finding it more 
courageous or more true. 
The Old Testament talks of life 
"neither in the idealistic nor the 
dualistic sense .,,23 Rather it talks of 
life as the highest good and of God as 
Lord of Life and death .24 Indeed, 
"God did not ," as von Rad points out , 
"allow the man who had become a 
fratricide (Genesis 4: IS) to be com-
pletely outlawed - even his life he 
took into a mysterious protective 
rela tionship. ,,25 
The New Testament talks of life in 
Christ , "the life of Resurrection 
(which) . . . only reaches full develo-
pment in the future . .. and (while) 
. .. to this extent , still an object of 
hope . . . is nevertheless in a certain 
sense a present reality ."26 
With Jurgen Moltmann, man is 
asking if "the real category of history 
is no longer the past and the transient, 
but the future .,,27 He asks if "To 
expect and seek a del iverance which 
does not embrace all that is and all 
that is not yet , has disastrous results 
when everyttting is staked upon it."28 
And whether it is not true that man 
"Always stands both within 
ttistory and also above history."29 
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Shortly after the first World War, 
Karl Barth insisted that "If Christian-
ity be not altogether and unreservedly 
eschatology, there remains in it no 
relationship to Christ."3o Almost 15 
years after the second World War, Karl 
Rahner insisted that "Anything that 
cannot be read and understood as a 
Christological assertion is not a genu-
ine eschatological assertion.',3 1 
Man questions whether both may 
not be right, and he also asks - in 
whatever words he may use - if 
Rahner may not also be right in 
asserting that "Christology is the end 
and beginning of anthropology ."32 
Think of the implications of this 
sta temen t. 
If Alexander Solzhenitsyn, this 
year's winner of the Nobel prize for 
literature , can rai se his voice to claim 
that "The meaning of existence (is) to 
preserve unspoiled , undisturbed and 
undistorted the image of eternity with 
which each person is born ,,,3 3 can we 
not raise ours in concert with him to 
sepak again of the imago Dei? Surely 
"Scripture knows of no life not 
worthy to be definitive , it does not 
recognize any life as superfluous.',34 
Finally, we must realize how 
inextricably interwoven are the re-
missio peccatorum which redeems us 
from our past ; the missio of love to 
which we have been called in the 
present; and the promissio of a future 
in Wllich man and the whole creation 
will be redeemed and in which history 
will find its fulfillment. (Romans 8 :22 , 
23) 
The question that is fundamental in 
the present controversy - whether the 
specific issue be abortion or "up-
dating" death, euthanasia or genetic 
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engineering, artificial inovulation or 
cloning, dominion over one's person 
versus society's dominion over one 
person - is not so much a question of 
when individual human life begins or 
when it ends. Rather it is a question of 
who man is . While man cannot be 
described in a few words, some from 
the pen of Karl Rahner speak with 
peculiar eloquence on these issues: 
Man "is not merely an instance of the 
universal, each man is something 
unique and ultimately never someone 
who can be totally deduced. . .. 
Because he is an individual, he has a 
valid existence which , as a real 
existence, does not coincide with his 
spatio-temporal existence ; he is 'im-
mortal' and the subject of an eternal 
destination and destiny. This is why 
the individual man , who is now, may 
never be forcibly sacrificed, in a 
manner which destroys him, for the 
future of 'humanity', of the others 
who come after him.,,3 5 
Furthermore , "When we have said 
everything about ourselves that can be 
described and defined , we still have 
said nothing about ourselves, unless we 
have included or implied the fact that 
we are beings who are referred to the 
incomprehensible God ."3 6 
In St. Ambrose 's time , it was 
necessary to speak of "Agnoscenda 
gratia, sed non ignoranda natura.,,37 
Henri de Lubac sa id : "I would wish to 
assert both terms of this precept to the 
full.,,38 But there remains the ques-
tion of whether modern man in 
agnoscenda natura has not fallen into 
ignoranda gratia. 
Let us - Catholic , Orthodox , and 
Protestant insist upon precise 
definitions of life, death, and man. Let 
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us caution medicine of the precedents 
that it is abandoning and the new ones 
that it is establishing; of the socio-
ethical issues with which it has 
involved itself in the abortion debate 
and of the fears which it has 
engendered in many in our society 
who recognize the socio-e thical issues 
implicit in the definitio n of brain 
death. Medicine has its rights , but it 
also has its duties. The jurist has an 
interest in the socio-ethical. So , too, 
do the philosopher and theologian. If 
Clemenceau suggested that wars are 
too important to be left to generals , is 
it not possible that Scientific Man may 
find that his fellow human beings 
consider science too important to be 
left to him, especially in consequence 
of his unilateral assumption of prerog-
atives which society did not delegate 
to him alone? Imagine for a moment 
the anomaly of Scientific Man's 
position on abortion and his definition 
of dea th. If a functioning brain is to 
serve as man's claim to life; if death of 
the organism as a whole is to be 
declared on the basis of brain death, 
then by what logic can the fetus with a 
functioning brain be treated as sub-
human or non-human? 
Medicine has to confine itself to the 
medical or insist that it alone of aJJ 
disciplines has the right to define and 
legisla te ; that, in abortion, it alone has 
the right to effect social and ethical 
change under the cloak of the 
confidentiality of the patient-doctor 
relationship ; that , in transplant sur-
gery , it alone can assume the exclusive 
righ t to define death , declare death, 
and then devise implementations of 
those decisions on the basis that it 
alone has the knowledge to do so. 
Society has not only the right but the 
duty to call for multidisciplinary 
dialogue and decision-making on such 
issues. 
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The spectre of Galileo may well 
have haunted the deliberations of 
Vatican II, but the spectre of a 
Hiroshima haunts many a sensitive 
scientist in his research. Nothing less 
than the future of man is at stake. 
However pluralistic the society is in 
which we live, we should not only 
insist upon precise definitions but 
upon precise standards of conduct in 
the implementation of those defini-
tions. We must accept only those 
definitions and standards that recog· 
nize the dignity and destiny of man -
definitions and standards with which 
all men, rich and poor, powerful and 
powerless, can live and die. 
Let us also be mindful of the 
educative role of the law in our 
communities and mindful of the need 
for Christian witness - a witness of 
word and example. Only free man can 
unite; only in Christ's service can their 
freedom be perfect; only in His will 
can they find peace . 
The present mood of the world 
may be of another mind , but in the 
currents and cross-currents of claim 
and counter·claim, the use and abuse 
of statistics, the insistence upon 
humanizing the machine and mecha-
mzmg man , upon relativizing the 
absolute and absolutizing the relative, 
let us remember that love of God and 
neighbor go hand in hand. Lest there 
be doubt of the kind of love which 
calls us and to which we are called, it 
is that described in the new command-
men t: "Love one another, even as I 
have loved you." (John 13:34) To 
adopt any other course is to fail Lord 
and neighbor. As the German Jesuit 
martyr , Alfred Delp, wrote from his 
prison cell in 1944: "At their core, 
these times through which we are 
living also carry the blessing and the 
mystery of God. It is only a matter of 
waiting and knowing how to wait until 
the hour has struck. 
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Let us pray for receptive and 
willing hearts that the warnings God 
sends us may penetrate our minds and 
help us to overcome the wilderness of 
this life . . . lest those who are our 
executioners today may at some 
future time be our accusers for the 
suppression of truth.,,3 9 
Never has there been greater need 
than now for those who in Christ's 
name and for His sake would serve 
mankind as Jurgen Moltmann proposes 
"not . . . that this world may remain 
what it is , or may be preserved in the 
state in which it is, but in order that it 
may transform itself and become what 
is promised to be.,,4o 
Is there hope? Yes, from those 
whose hope arises from hope in Christ ; 
those who, in the words of St. 
Augustine , at the same time realize 
that "there is no love without hope, 
no hope without love, and neither love 
nor hope without faith.,,41 
Man-made men " self-created 
man,,42 if you will - may be viewed 
as an experimental laboratory. God· 
created man can be viewed only as a 
privileged sanctuary . 
REFERENCES 
I. Nature, Vol. CCXXVII, July 4, 1970, 
pp.27-33. 
2. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Die· 
tionary, XXIV Ed., W.B. Saunders Co., 
Philadelphia, 1965 : "the sorting out 
and classification of casualties of war or 
other disaster to determine priority of 
need and place of treatment." 
3. "U.S. Population Forecast Is Cut," San 
Francisco Chronicle, Times-Post Ser-
vice, Aug. 13, 1970, pp. 1 and 30. 
4. Thomas Merton , Faith and Violence . 
University of Notre Dame Press , 1968, 
p.104. 
5. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Vol. CCV, No.6 , Aug. 5, 
1968. 
6. Webster 's VII New Collegiate Die· 
tionary, G. and C. Merriam Co. , 
Springfield, Mass., 1969: From "Wil· 
liam Burke, died 1829, irish criminal 
executed for this crime ... to suffocate 
or strangle in order to obtain a body to 
245 
be sold for dissection." 
7. Daedalus. Spring, 1969 , p. 526 . 
8. Ibid., p. 244. 
9. Hans Jonas, Against the Stream . a 
personal communication (July, 1970) 
from a work that hopefull y will be 
published soon. 
10. Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., "Supplying 
Organs for Transplantation ," Michigan 
Law R eview. Vol. LXVIII , No . 5 , April , 
1970, pp. 811-866 , especially pp. 
846-847. 
II. "Maies tas est summa in cives ac 
subditos legibusque soluta potestas ," 
See OUo von Gierke, The Development 
of Political Theory, W. W. Norton , New 
York , 1939, p. 158. C.J. Fr iedrich, 
Constitutional Government and Demo· 
cracy, Ginn and Company, Boston, 
1946 , p. 102 ; Francis Coker , Readings 
ill Political Philosophy, Macmillan and 
Co., New York , 193 8, p. 374 ; and 
George Sabine, A History of Political 
Til eory. Henry Holt and Co., New 
York , 1937, p. 405. 
12. Rabbi Richard L. Rubin stein , After 
A uschwitz, Bobbs-Merrill , 1966, p. 77. 
13. E. SchilJebeeckx, OP, God ti, e Future 
of Mall. Sheed and Ward, New York , 
1968, p. 176. 
14. Ibid .. p. 177. 
15. Karl Raimer, SJ , Theological In vestiga· 
tions. Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1969, 
Vol. VI , pp. 60, 61. 
16. Ibid., p. 66 . 
17. Garrett Hardin, " Parenthood : Right or 
Privilege?" Science. Vol. CLXlX, No . 
3944 , July 31 , 1970, p. 427 : See also 
Paul Elulich, The Populatioll 9Bomb, 
Ballantine Books, New York , 196 8; 
Garrett Hardin , "The Tragedy of 
Comm ons, " Science. Vol. CLXJI , No. 
3859, Dec. 13, 1968, pp. 1243-4 8; and 
Robert H. Williams, MD, "Our Role in 
the Generation , Modifica tion and Ter-
mination of Life," The Archives of 
Internal Medicine, Vol. CXXlV, No.2, 
August, 1969, pp. 215-237. 
18. Jacques Ellul , Violence, Seabury Press, 
New York, 1969, p. 29. 
19. Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography, 
Philosophical Library , New York, 1949 , 
p.46. 
20. Arthur Cochrane, The Church 's Confes· 
sion Under Hitler, Westminister Press, 
Philadelphia, 1962, p. 40. 
21. J. Robert Oppenheimer , "Where Is 
Science Heading? " Realities, Septe-
mber, 1963. 
22. Karl Raimer , SJ, Theological In vestiga· 
tions, Helico n Press, Baltimore, 1966, 
Vol. V, p. 8. 
246 
23. Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's 
"Theologisches Worterbuch wm Neuen 
Testament ," Harper , New York , 1965 , 
Vol. V, Book II , p.19. 
24. Ibid. , p. 4 . See also Numbers 
XXVlI:16 ; Job XJI : IO ; Deuteronomy 
XXXlI :39. 
25. Gerhard von Rad , Old Testament 
Theology, Harper and Row , New York, 
1962, Vol. I , p. 155. 
26. Bible Key Words, op cit., Vol. V, Book 
II , p. 68. See also Romans V :I-II and 
VIII : I 2-39 ; I Corintilians XV ; and II 
Corinthialls V : 1-5 . 
27 . Jurgen Moltmann, Th eology of Hope, 
Harper and Row , New York , 1967 , p. 
260. 
28. Ibid., p. 263. 
29. Ibid. , p. 271. 
30. Ibid., ci ted by Moltmann, p. 39. 
31. Karl Rahner , SJ , Theological In vesti-
gations, Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1966 , 
Vol. IV , p . 343. 
32. Ibid. , p. 117. 
33. Alexander Solsz henitsyn , Cancer Ward, 
Bantam Books, Farrar Straus and 
Giroux, Inc., New York, 196 8, p. 428. 
34. Karl Rahner, SJ , Th eological In vestiga· 
tions. Helicon Press, Bal timore, 1966, 
Vol. IV, p. 351. 
35. Karl Rahner , SJ , Theological Investiga· 
tions. Helicon Press, Baltimore, Third 
Printing, 1966, Vol. II , p. 239. 
36. Karl Rahner, S1. Theological In vestiga· 
tions, Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1966, 
Vol. IV, p. 109. 
37. St. Ambrose ,In Lucam, Book VIII , No . 
32. 
38. Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the 
Supernatural, Herder and Herder, 1967 , 
p. 42. 
39. Alfred Delp, SJ , Th e Prison Meditations 
of Father Delp, with an introduction by 
Thomas Merton , Macmillan and Co. , 
New York , 1963, p. 22. 
40. Jurgen Moltmann, Th eology of Hope, 
Harper and Row, New York , 1967 , p. 
327. 
41. Th e Basic Works of St. A ugustine, ed. 
by Whitney Jennings Oates, Random 
House, New York , 1948, Vol. I, p. 661 
("The Enchiridion ," Chapter VlIl) . 
42. Karl Rahner , SJ , "Experiment : Man," 
Th eology Digest, Sesquicentennial 
Issue, 1968, pp. 57-69 , and "Zum 
Problem der genetischen Manipulation 
aus der Sicht des Theologen," in 
"Menschenzuchtung: Das Problem der 
genetischen Manipulierung des 
Menschen ," edited by Friedrich Wagner 
and published by Verlag C. H. Beck , 
Munich, 1969, pp. 135-166. 
Linacre Quarterly 
